Dealing with the Junta: Is it time to cover the iron fist with velvet gloves?

Kalyan M. Kemburi
Research Analyst, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore
27 Aug 2010

In three months time, the Burmese along with the rest of the world hope to witness history in the making as Myanmar heralds into a new era by (re)entering the path of democracy. However, just under this tier of hope lie elements of despair, especially with the possibility of the military junta’s efforts to limit the scope and nature of the elections. These concerns along with the junta’s refusal to let in international election observers are giving rise to new demands, especially from the West, for tougher action against the junta. However, the reality in the words of a Southeast Asian diplomat is that “we have few carrots that they (junta) are interested in and no sticks” that can hurt them. Therefore, by seeking more coercive measures we are trying the same alchemist formula of transforming copper into gold i.e. an autocracy into democracy through the “sanctions” formula. This piece argues that the approach of relying only on sanctions has outlived its purpose in Myanmar, and a new coordinated multilateral engagement is required in dealing with the junta.

The following paragraphs seek to explain why sanctions had a limited impact on Myanmar and thus the concomitant need for a new approach. This explanation is accomplished through the analytical framework developed by Jean-Marc Blanchard and Norrin Ripsman (“Political Theory of Economic Statecraft,” Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 4, 2008). This evaluation that could reinforce the ongoing efforts for a new strategy that includes the use of incentives and not just sanctions, which have unfortunately become the only tool in the arsenal of foreign policy mandarins.

Although there is a lack of consensus on defining the contours of economic sanctions, Johan Galtung’s framework comes close in identifying the mechanisms and objectives involved, albeit with limitations. David Baldwin in his seminal work, Economic Statecraft, outlines Galtung’s framework: sanctions aim at “economic value deprivation leading to economic disintegration which leads to political disintegration, which in turn leads to compliance.” Simply stated, coercive economic measures (such as trade embargoes, freezing of financial assets, etc.) are used to achieve desired policy compliance from the target state. The compliance could be socio, economic, political, or normative.

In case of Myanmar, sanctions were first imposed in 1988 following the violent crackdown on the pro-democracy demonstrations, which resulted in more than 3,000 deaths. The sanctions were further intensified following the junta’s dismissal of the people’s verdict in May 1990 general elections; the European Union got on to the sanctions bandwagon from 1996. This economic and political coercion was primarily aimed at the military junta to bring in a more democratically oriented political change. Initially, the sanctions performed their task of signaling; however, later they not only proved limited in bringing change but also became counterproductive by making the junta more entrenched and isolated.

According to Blanchard and Ripsman, the success of economic sanctions is dependent on the “target state’s level of stateness”, which is the relationship between the state and its society. The degree of stateness is ascertained through three components: decision-making autonomy, capacity, and legitimacy. Decision-making autonomy is the ability of the state to implement policies in spite of domestic political opposition. Capacity is the ability of the state to penetrate and control its society through coercive (security apparatus) and non-coercive means (financial incentives or disincentives). Finally, legitimacy is the degree to which people accept, respect and obey the political authority. This legitimacy could be attained either through democratically established procedures or through catering to the political and economic needs of key constituencies within the society.

Since the military takeover in 1962, Myanmar’s political history is riddled with illustrations of the government’s decision-making autonomy. In the recent past, the brutal suppression of protests by monks, the feeble response to Cyclone Nargis and a further callous decision to organize a constitutional referendum when people were still reeling from the cyclone’s destruction reveals the junta’s ability to implement policies in spite of domestic political opposition. Apart from a ruthless and omnipresent security apparatus, the military government has also developed several non-coercive means to cultivate constituencies that favor the current regime. For example, Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2003 notes, “the military leaders have systematically constructed a kind of “cadre capitalism,” in which they have direct control of key industries and indirect and nearly complete control of the rest of the economy.” Blanchard and Ripsman note that higher the level of stateness the greater the ability of the target state (in this case Myanmar) to follow a policy independent of domestic political considerations, a policy to either resist or comply with the demands of the sender (i.e. the sanctioning state). Myanmar scores high on all the three components, thus, successfully resisting the sanctions.

In addition, the effects of sanctions are further limited due to several international actors jumping over the fence, notably China and some Southeast Asian countries (especially Thailand and Singapore). For China, a combination of political, economic and security factors—alternative to the Malaccan dilemma, access to natural resources, market for Chinese products and investment—drive the relationship. In case of Southeast Asia, a concatenation of several factors including energy security, trade, and the principle of nonintervention propel the relationship. Even the Indian government, which is usually enamored with the epithet of world’s largest democracy, is involved in a delicate balancing by engaging the military junta. This engagement is partly geopolitical (read balancing China and access to energy resources) and partly arising from internal security needs i.e. to deal with the insurgent groups in the provinces neighboring Burma, who traditionally used it as staging grounds.

In view of limitations of the sanctions approach, the international community (especially the US) should consider the various proposals for a new approach in dealing with the junta including a multilateral initiative (bringing in ASEAN, China, Japan, and India,) that includes a coordinated engagement. In a coordinated engagement, the military government’s ability to play off the regional actors would be severely limited. This multilateral initiative could eventually include a gradual performance-linked withdrawal of sanctions.

Moreover, after more than forty years of military dictatorship, which resulted in almost an autarkic society, it could be assumed that many of the socio-economic institutions have decayed and people of Myanmar are gradually losing experience with these institutions. The international community should strive to revitalize these institutions and help the Burmese in capacity building, especially in areas of education and entrepreneurship. In time to come this 2Es approach of education and entrepreneurship would strengthen the Burmese society both socially and economically, which in return would create an environment that allows the common man to be politically empowered.

© Copyright 2010, Southeast Asia Research Programme by IPCS-SAEA GROUP

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